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CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY IN A POST-WAR WORLD
Elizabeth Metelak
“The Council of Lithuania, as the sole representative of the 
Lithuanian nation, based on the recognized right to national 
self-determination, and on the Vilnius Conference’s resolution 
of September 18–23, 1917, proclaims the restoration of the in-
dependent state of Lithuania, founded on democratic principles, 
with its capital in Vilnius and declares the termination of all state 
ties which formerly bound this State to other nations.”1 
On February 16, 1918, the Tarbya, or Council of Lithuania, signed the above 
Act of Independence of Lithuania, declaring the restoration of Lithuania as an 
independent state after centuries under Prussian and Russian imperial rule, and 
setting off more than a decade of regional conflict concerning what this could 
and should mean for Lithuanians and their neighbors. Although occupying 
German forces initially suppressed this document, ensuring a pointed lack of 
immediate results, the tides of war gradually bestowed the Tarbya’s words with 
more than mere symbolism. Even before Germany formally surrendered, the 
1  Lietvos Tarbya, “Lietuvos Nepriklausomybės Aktas” in “Historical Lithuania,” Vilnews.com, 
last modified 14
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Lithuanian Constituent Assembly had authored a provisional constitution, 
and Lithuanians celebrated Armistice Day less than two weeks later with the 
establishment of the first government of an independent republic of Lithuania.
 Relying on the democratic principles espoused by the victors of World War 
One and the promises of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Lithuanian leaders forged 
ahead on the path to self-determination, immersing themselves in the tasks of 
designing and implementing a functioning government that corresponded to 
their understandings and expectations of a Lithuanian state. Within no time 
at all however, these leaders found their plans and definitions challenged on 
nearly every front. Within Lithuania itself, political parties old and new, from 
Christian Democrats and Populists to Social Democrats, Communists, and 
National Unionists, each struggled to ensure that their agenda took precedence 
in the newly formed state. Outside the government, Lithuania’s various ethnic, 
religious, class, and occupational groups engaged in their own conversations 
about independence and the new Lithuania.
 External interpretations and agendas for the Lithuanian region also devel-
oped in the massive international realignment that characterized the end of the 
war.  Despite the Allied victors agreement on the need for self-determination 
in post-war Europe from an ideological standpoint, many powers delayed of-
ficial recognition of the new Lithuanian state as unimportant, asserting a need 
for additional evidence prior to considering the case. They demanded that the 
Lithuanian government prove in some way that they in fact held any sort of 
historic or ethnographic claim to lands and people contained within the borders 
of the new state. The fledgling League of Nations, suddenly responsible for 
determining the status of would-be states, excluded Lithuania from membership 
on the grounds that the United States already refused to recognize Lithuania. 
The United States, at the time embroiled in a frenzy of anti-communist hysteria 
known as the Red Scare, justified its refusal as an unwillingness to acknowledge 
the new Communist government of Russia and the loss of Russia’s imperial 
prerogatives to Lithuanian lands. 
 In this period of uncertainty, several of Lithuania’s neighbors saw the op-
portunity to make their own claims concerning the nature of the Lithuanian 
state. The Red Army invaded in November 1918, seeking to reclaim lands once 
considered part of the Russian Empire. A group of German military adventurers 
also took up arms against Lithuania in hopes of preserving German influence 
in the region. Hot on their heels, newly independent Poland swept in from the 
55
Elizabeth Metelak
2 For example, John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century, (London: Longman, 1991).
3 Alfred Erich Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question: 1920-1928, (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1966), ix.
4 Zigmantas Kiaupa, The History of Lithuania, (Lithuania: baltos lankos, 2002), 240-258.
southeast as part of a grand offensive against the Russian army. In the process, 
they unashamedly occupied Lithuania’s capital at Vilna, and claimed over a 
third of Lithuanian territory as its own. 
 Given the lasting impact of this period on future political developments 
and diplomatic relationships, the dearth of academic analysis on this region 
proves particularly disappointing and problematic. This partially stems from fifty 
years of Soviet occupation that limited scholarly access to materials concerning 
Lithuania, and also discouraged public discussions and displays of nationalism 
within Lithuania itself. Most studies that even mention the formation of the 
Lithuanian state do so briefly or within an analysis of the Baltic States as a 
group.2 Moreover, authors tend to frame the 1910’s and 1920’s in light of the 
1990’s  round of independence, a mere blip within the more general story of 
occupation and oppression finally shaken off in 1991. Not until recent years 
have a few more-informed studies of this topic emerged, mostly by Lithuanian 
citizens or expatriates, indicating continued lack of interest toward the region 
among the majority of scholars (and the world at large).
  In Alfred Senn’s exploration of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict and its rela-
tionship to Western powers, he blames the situation’s lack of resolution on the 
ignorance of the Western Allies concerning Eastern Europe’s nationalist trends 
and their inability to engage Poland and Lithuania as two sovereign nations.3 
For Senn, this combination of condescension and incomprehension drastically 
crippled the League of Nations’ and Entente Powers’ abilities to act decisively 
or effectively in Lithuania, to the detriment of the young Lithuanian state. 
Unfortunately, Senn refuses to engage the Polish perspective in his analysis be-
cause he perceived it as less meaningful than Lithuania’s. Meanwhile, Zigmantas 
Kiaupa eschews any detailed analysis of the League, and focuses instead on the 
military conflicts that plagued Lithuania’s early years, and their influence in 
shaping the political structure of the state.4 Both these studies suffer however, 
from the innate nationalist sentiments of their own authors, adopting Lithuania’s 
historic enemies as their own and failing to address conflicting viewpoints 
objectively. This paper seeks to remedy these deficiencies by creating a more 
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complete and multi-dimensional analysis concerning the formative years of the 
first Lithuanian Republic. Moreover, it will attempt to draw further conclusions 
concerning the creation and interpretation of Lithuanian national identity as 
a multi-directional discourse between Lithuania and other entities. 
 Over the first years of the new state’s existence, Lithuanians expelled the 
Russian and German troops, and held off further advances by the Poles, while 
presenting and re-presenting their case for existence and certain prerogatives 
to the League of Nations and individual national governments. Set upon 
on all sides, and desperate for acceptance as a legitimate European state, the 
Lithuanians compiled mountains of historic, ethnographic, and linguistic 
evidence to support their right to exist and to claim certain territories. Given 
the intensely nationalistic rhetoric surrounding nearly every aspect of the First 
World War, it comes as no surprise that this evidence would ultimately outline 
Lithuania’s own equally intense brand of national identity. More importantly, 
however, these interactions created a vast international dialogue concerning the 
nature and identity of the Lithuanian state that reached far beyond Lithuania’s 
disputed borders. This dialogue engages a wide variety of speakers in complex 
issues of democracy, national identity, and self-determination, both within 
the Lithuanian state and without. Ultimately, these players have as much, if 
not more, impact on the nature of the Lithuanian State as the Lithuanians 
themselves, and it is this dialogue that truly shapes the strength and character 
of Lithuania’s national identity. 
 While a significant number of new nations, states, and combinations thereof, 
emerged from the chaos of the First World War, and the international com-
munity devoted significant time and energy to each case, this paper restricts 
itself to issues of Lithuanian national identity and statehood, except where 
other cases (such as Poland) play a direct role in Lithuanian development. This 
approach does not seek to belittle the efforts of other groups or organizations in 
this process, but rather to focus on the methods, successes, and failures of one 
people whose story and importance find themselves frequently overlooked in 
studies of the region and period, but still hold vital historical significance for 
anyone concerned with issues of national identity in the formation of states. 
  In its interpretation on nationalism as a multi-directional discourse, this 
paper relies on people and documents from a wide range of sources, which have 
been incorporated as much as possible in the scope of this work. Unfortunately 
the author’s own language limitations have heavily impacted the types of sources 
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consulted in the course of this research. Thus, while a few documents have 
been translated from Lithuanian specifically for this paper, the majority of 
sources are those originally published in English - diplomatic correspondence, 
US newspaper articles, US Senate, and League of Nations documentation - or 
those translated to English by Lithuanians and Lithuanian Americans for the 
benefit of the international community. While these circumstances might 
neglect the voice of the Lithuanian peasantry particularly, certain travelogues 
serve as a vehicle for some peasant sentiments concerning Lithuania’s place in 
the world at large.5 Moreover, this approach demonstrates the intricacies of the 
dialogue surrounding national identity and the vast international scale within 
which these conversations occur.
 Due to the complexities of war and ever-shifting borders, as well as con-
flicting claims over Lithuanian territory and identity, many people, places, and 
organizations appear under different names in different accounts. In striving 
for historical accuracy, this paper incorporates the most relevant terminology 
in each situation, dependent on the time period and the term used by each 
particular document. Thus Lithuania’s present capital, Vilnius, may appear 
as Wilno (Polish), Vilnius (Lithuanian), or Vilna (international), and certain 
people’s names may appear in their Polish or Lithuanian renditions (for example) 
depending on the context. These distinctions are not intended to confuse, but 
to realistically reflect the language of the period and reiterate the complexities 
inherent to the formation of national identity within Lithuania. 
Young Nationalism: Infancy to Adolescence
Modern Lithuanian nationalism traces its roots to Lithuanians’ reactions against 
growing oppression in the second half of the nineteenth century. While re-
gional uprisings and agitations, supplemented by differences in language and 
culture, fostered a level of national consciousness in many parts of Eastern 
Europe, Lithuanian nationalism found its growth stunted by the region’s his-
toric union with Poland, the Polonization of many Lithuanian elites, as well 
as the region’s absorption into the Russian Empire in 1795.6 Not until Tsar 
Alexander II officially abolished serfdom throughout the empire in 1861 did 
5 See Peter Saurusaitis, Thirty Days in Lithuania, (Illinois: Call Printing Company, 1920), for 
example.
6  Alfred Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959), 4.
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nationalist sentiment in Lithuania truly develop a life of its own.7 1861-1862 
saw widespread demonstrations by Lithuanian peasants angry at delays in 
emancipation, followed by a joint Polish-Lithuanian uprising in 1863. The 
tsar’s harsh dealings with the Uprising led to a general decline in the power 
of the Lithuanian gentry, who suffered land confiscations and heavy fines for 
their involvement.  Alexander II and his son’s ensuing policies of Russification 
restricted the use of Lithuanian language, the practicing of Catholicism, and 
otherwise limited Lithuanian politics and culture.
 The same agitations that set Lithuanians at odds with their Russian masters 
ultimately severed ties with their Polish brothers-in-arms as well. The paths of 
the two peoples converged in the fourteenth century through the marriage of 
their two sovereigns, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiela and the Polish queen 
Jadwiga, to form a kingdom that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 
Lithuanians claim that in 1569, the Polish coerced Lithuania into a formal union 
signed at Lublin that infringed upon their status as a sovereign people.8 The 
Poles conversely claim that this union sprang from the mutual strengthening 
of their ties and that it brought unity and culture to the Lithuanians.9 Over 
time, much of the Lithuanian gentry adopted Polish language and culture, 
leaving Lithuanian peasants to preserve their own language and traditions, but 
inadvertently blurring the lines between the two cultures more than replacing 
either. Authors like the poet Adam Mickiewicz wrote proudly of the Lithuanian 
fatherland, but referred to the Polish Litwa rather than the Lithuanian Lietuva.10 
Even in Vilna, Lithuania’s historic capital, one could hear far more Polish or 
even Yiddish spoken in the streets than Lithuanian, making the city a source 
of contention until the end of the Second World War.
 Over time, a small Lithuanian intelligentsia emerged, striving to reestablish 
the language and culture that had fallen out of use among the educated under 
Polish influence. The region found itself divided, at times so much that one 
brother might identify as Polish while another declared himself Lithuanian. The 
1863 Uprising brought these tensions to the forefront as Polish and Lithuanian 
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aims for the rebellion diverged drastically. Polish leaders spoke of Lithuania 
as a territory of Poland, while many Lithuanian leaders viewed the uprising as 
an opportunity to pull away from the Poles and restore Lithuanian autonomy. 
These conflicting viewpoints led to irreparable divisions between the Polish 
and Lithuanian nobilities in their plans for the uprising and the future of the 
region. Such radically different interpretations of the region’s history and cul-
ture sparked massive conflict that continued unabated and unresolved despite 
larger conflicts with the Russian and German Empires and even as younger 
generations of Poles and Lithuanians began to develop new forms of national-
ism within their respective cultures.11
 Thomas Balkelis traces the origins of this new Lithuanian nationalism to an 
emerging intelligentsia born from the imperial Russian education system and 
subsequent exposure to Russian intellectual culture.12 As increasing numbers 
of Lithuanian students graduated from Russian universities and began seeking 
employment, many of them found work as doctors, lawyers, and teachers, and 
made their way into Lithuania’s Polish and Jewish dominated cities for the first 
time. In Balkelis’ estimation, cities like Mariampol and Vilna became centers 
of patriotic activity, while other members of the intelligentsia assimilated into 
Russian culture or else took refuge abroad.13 These increasingly secular urban 
intellectuals orchestrated the creation of illegal patriotic publications like Aušra 
(Dawn) and Varpas (The Bell) that allowed them to voice their nationalist sen-
timents and political agendas in the now-banned Lithuanian language. This 
defiance however, required time to bridge the gap between the city and the 
country, between the wealthy and the peasants. An urban middle class grew 
slowly and painfully as professionals from peasant backgrounds struggled to 
adjust their way of life.14 By the turn of the century, this group, while by no 
means cohesive, had somewhat consolidated political leadership within a covert 
Lithuanian nationalist movement.15 Unfortunately, this movement’s discussions 
and actions remained disconnected from society at large.
 Lithuanians only began to remedy this breach with the outbreak of revo-
lution across the Russian Empire in 1905. Massive unrest within the peasant 
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and labor populations ignited a fire of political unrest at every level of society 
within the imperial context. Emboldened by the actions of the lower classes, 
underground political leaders throughout the land also arose in opposition to 
the tsar’s autocratic government with calls for representation and democracy. 
Lithuania proved no exception to this case. Workers’ strikes and agricultural 
demonstrations demanded social equities long denied to the lower classes, jolt-
ing Lithuanians into action on every level while also providing an audience 
with which political leaders could share their agendas. While the Lithuanian 
intelligentsia welcomed such opportunities to promote national consciousness, 
they proved tremendously unprepared to harness the energies of the peasants 
and workers.16 Hopelessly divided amongst themselves, various political par-
ties broached numerous resolutions designed to end the conflict and secure a 
permanent peace, but achieved little in the way of unifying the movement. 
 Despite the lack of political unity in this moment, a 1919 publication 
recalls that in 1905, “the national consciousness in Lithuania was so strong 
and widespread, throughout the land that it was possible to call a convention 
from all parts of Lithuania.”17 As Lithuanians gathered for the convention then 
known as the All-Lithuanian Assembly, now referenced as the Grand Seimas, 
the nationalist movement began to coalesce into something far greater than 
fragmented pockets of political elites.18 The congress met in late November, 
with roughly 2,000 delegates covering topics from autonomy to education 
to agriculture, and eventually settling on a rather ambitions program for the 
unification and improvement of Lithuanian society. This event also ushered 
a greater number of common people into the political arena than ever before, 
forming a mass movement where only elites had agitated formerly. This drastic 
shift in participation found the people of Lithuania increasingly invested in 
the formation of a Lithuanian nation and brought them one step closer to a 
coherent national identity.
 Although the Revolution of 1905 petered out without truly democratizing 
the empire, the establishment of the Duma, an empire-wide representative 
assembly announced by Nicholas II’s October Manifesto, sparked significant 
interest within Lithuania. The same concessions granted Lithuanians increased 
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political freedoms, including the ability to publish in their native language for 
the first time in over forty years. These developments ushered in waves of new 
publications, cultural, political, and otherwise, in the Lithuanian language. 
Despite the Duma’s repeated dissolutions, Lithuanians actively engaged in 
that forum as long as they could, before ultimately returning their focus to 
Lithuanian people and lands. Lithuanian cultural work became the defining 
element of these years, leading to the development and refinement of a national 
culture long before the movement could propose the idea of an independent 
Lithuanian state. Music, dress, and writing flourished as distinct costumes 
and customs came to stand as emblems of the Lithuanian people, and spread 
through the cities like fire. This cultural coherency left Lithuania far more 
united than many of its nearest neighbors, eagerly awaiting the opportunities 
that war would soon bring.
Growing Pains: War and Acceleration
The coming of world war rapidly accelerated the development of national 
identity in Lithuania. Most scholars agree that despite (or perhaps because 
of ) their own nationalist sentiments, when Germany declared war on Russia 
on August 1, 1914, Lithuanians rallied enthusiastically to the tsar’s cause.19 
This enthusiasm, however, appears much more opportunistic than heartfelt; 
leaders in Vilna almost immediately submitted a declaration to the Russian 
government in favor of combining the two Lithuanian jurisdictions and grant-
ing them autonomous status within the empire. Lithuanian political leaders 
hoped that the context of war might allow them to gain political concessions 
from the empire that might have otherwise gone unaddressed.20 Their “Amber 
Declaration” met with a rapid, angry dismissal by the Russian government, but 
such sentiments only gained momentum in Lithuania as the war dragged on.21 
 As these conversations unfolded, Russian and German hostilities quickly 
transformed Lithuania into a warzone. Much of the early fighting during the 
First World War took place not in France and Belgium, as the focus of many 
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retellings seems to indicate, but in the east, where the Russian Empire and 
the Central Powers swept back and forth across Poland and Lithuania in their 
quests for supremacy. For those remaining in the region, the “terrible destruc-
tion caused by war” ensured that impoverishment, starvation, and displacement 
became the norm.22 Forests and vegetation disappeared in the wake of power-
ful new artillery raids, while cities and farms burned to the ground with an 
alarming frequency.23 Compounding this distress, many maps at this time, and 
consequently early relief efforts, categorized Lithuania as Northern Poland, 
assuming that Polish relief agencies would seek to alleviate the suffering of 
this region as a matter of course. Unsurprisingly, Polish relief agencies already 
struggling to address the needs of Polish war victims had little ability or desire 
to stretch their resources any thinner for non-Poles (especially not their rivals 
in Lithuania), leaving Lithuanians in a desperate state.24 
 The coming of the German occupation quickly multiplied the intensity of 
suffering for the Lithuanian people, but this shift in power also ushered in new 
opportunities and risks for Lithuanians. By mid-1915, Germany had taken all 
of Lithuania, on into Latvia and Russia, forcing Russian officials and hundreds 
of thousands of refugees to flee deep into Russian territory. The German oc-
cupational government that replaced these officials proved exceedingly harsh, 
bringing inflation, a new currency, and compulsory labor to the already devas-
tated land.25 Though bitterly oppressive, the occupation led Lithuanians to feel 
increasingly empowered to act on their own behalf, able to shape Germany’s 
perceptions and administration of the region in ways that the Russian Empire 
had long prevented. Stanley Page elaborates on this trade-off in The Formation 
of the Baltic States, as he unravels the German thought process behind actions 
concerning the Eastern Front. By late 1916 and early 1917, Germany’s posi-
tion in the war looked rather tenuous. Hoping to recruit desperately-needed 
soldiers from their newly conquered territories, German leaders proclaimed 
the Kingdom of Poland an autonomous region within German jurisdiction, 
allowing the Poles a level of local authority that had long been denied provided 
that they supplied soldiers for the German army.26 Such a move however, posed 
22 “Distress in Lithuania,” New York Times, (Aug 12, 1915), 3.
23 Ibid., 3.
24 Ibid., 1.
25 Kiaupa, 230.
26 Page, 32.
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numerous risks to the Germans, namely that encouraging Polish nationalism 
significantly weakened Germany’s grip on the region. Page believes that the 
Germans’ only logical means to discourage nationalistic agitation in Poland lay 
in simultaneously promoting Lithuanian nationalism, which, due to the afore-
mentioned disputes, frequently manifested itself as anti-Polish.27 Although they 
refrained from granting Lithuania autonomous standing as well, this strategy 
placed the two groups at odds with one another and distracted Lithuanians 
from formulating strong nationalist ideas or thoughts of independence. 
 While the decision to encourage two opposing nationalisms may have 
sprung from Germany’s dire need to recruit able-bodied men for the front lines, 
German leadership seems to have significantly underestimated the strength and 
will of both movements in their calculations. Far from keeping one another in 
check, the leeway granted by the German strategy quickly transformed into the 
justification for subsequent demands for even greater levels of autonomy within 
Lithuania.  Meanwhile, Russia’s political turmoil began to take precedence over 
its war effort and its leaders began considering a separate peace with Germany. 
This dialogue centered primarily on the question of the German-occupied border 
regions, leading Lithuanians to fear immense losses of land and authority to 
the Poles in any settlement that might be reached. Poland had already (albeit 
prematurely) announced their annexation of Lithuania on May 24, 1917, spur-
ring Lithuanians to cooperate with the Germans far more than they had ever 
intended.28 Lithuanians hoped that this cooperation would convince Germany 
to protect the integrity of Lithuania’s borders from unwelcome Polish incursions. 
In reality, German concessions stemmed far more from their own agendas than 
any real concern for the Lithuanians. 
 Attempts to define Lithuanian borders and identity faced further obstacles 
when the Bolsheviks rose to power in Russia in October of 1917. Seeking to 
remove themselves from the war as quickly as possible with as little loss of ter-
ritory as it could negotiate, Russia’s Communist Party entered deliberations 
with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. Through this process, the Bolsheviks clearly 
demonstrated that they possessed no desire to relinquish any of the territories 
belonging to the former Russian Empire. Alfred Senn notes that the Bolsheviks 
almost immediately established a Commissariat of Lithuanian Affairs and began 
27 Page, 32.
28 Kiaupa, 235.
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suppressing nationalist agitation among Lithuanian refugees and refugee orga-
nizations based in Moscow and Petrograd.29 Moreover, neither the Bolsheviks 
nor the Germans permitted Lithuanians to join the delegations sent to the peace 
talks, forcing them to agree to German authority and the restriction of all but 
the most basic cultural autonomy in return for guarantees that Lithuania would 
remain intact and separate from Poland.30 While one nationalist finagled his way 
to the talks as an advisor to the Ukrainian delegation, the Lithuanians could 
do little to directly influence the nature of the discussion.31 They continued 
to meet with representatives of the German government to curry favor and 
gain more favorable terms for Lithuania, but their hands remained effectively 
tied throughout the conversation. This relative impotence proved short-lived, 
however, when continued military aggression forced the Bolsheviks to drop all 
demands and sign the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in early 1918, relinquishing their 
claims to all of its now German-occupied territories. Free from the uncertain-
ties of the peace talks, Lithuanians immediately renewed their efforts to gain 
whatever autonomy the Germans would grant. 
 Even as they agitated within the parameters of German authority, Lithuanians 
began seeing the possibility of a truly independent Lithuania rising from the 
ashes of war. In January of 1918, the Lietuvos Aidas (Echo of Lithuania), a 
four page daily sponsored by the Tarbya, published several articles that testify 
to Lithuanians’ strong nationalist sentiments and reflect the development of 
Lithuanian’s hopes for the future. On New Year’s Day, 1918, a second-page ar-
ticle recalled the 1905 Revolution and the Seimas that culminated in Lithuania’s 
first claim of political autonomy within the Russian Empire.32 The author 
hearkens back to what he considers Lithuania’s “first public protest” of its 
status, lauding the fire and passion of the Seimas, which he likens to a volcano 
of agitation in which the Lithuanian people finally voiced their determination 
to reclaim their long-lost political autonomy.33 The article pointedly credits 
the Seimas with having “convinced [the Lithuanians] that it [was] time to take 
29 Alfred Senn, Emergence, 29.
30 Ibid., 29-32.
31 Ibid., 31.
32 “Atsiminimai ir įspūdžiai iš Didžiojo Vilniaus Seimos” (Remembrances and Impressions of 
The Great Seimas of Vilnius), Lietuvos Aidas, trans. Kristina Petruitytė, January 1, 1918, #1(49), 
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65
Elizabeth Metelak
actions and show that Lithuania [had] a right to seek its freedom.”34 By un-
derscoring the similarities between Lithuania’s situation in 1905 and 1918, the 
author indicates an avid hope to revive these sentiments within the Lithuanian 
population and reawaken a “real desire to walk the country out of misery.”35
 Just four days later, the front page of the Lietuvos Aidas declared to all of 
Lithuania that “[an] independent and democratically organized country with 
ethnological boundaries [was] needed” for Lithuanians to continue developing 
as a people.36 The article referenced a 1917 conference in Vilnius in which two 
hundred and twenty-two delegates had secured a general consensus to that effect 
and reiterated their desire for independence to come swiftly.37 Describing these 
desires as the “voice and consciousness” of the people, the author publically 
incorporated statehood into the nationalist conception of Lithuanian identity. 
The author also stipulated that an independent Lithuanian state required its 
capital to remain in Vilnius, implicitly alluding to the city’s importance within 
the Lithuanian framework and foreshadowing the coming conflicts concerning 
it.38 These articles reflect the ever-growing agitation among Lithuanian leaders as 
the war dragged on, a sentiment that increasingly could be heard in all corners 
of Lithuania, at every level of society. While certain political groups maintained 
separate agendas, the general consensus continued to grow daily among the 
Lithuanian people, soon to culminate in their Declaration of Independence.39 
Long Distance Relationship: Émigré Advocacy as Nationalism
While Lithuania struggled to navigate the hardships of war and negotiate their 
tenuous position between Russia and Germany, people and events outside the 
Baltic took an active role in shaping Lithuania’s prospects. While scholars dis-
agree as to which groups played the most vital roles in influencing the fledgling 
Lithuanian identity, expatriates, refugees, and others, particularly in the United 
34 Ibid., 3.
35 Ibid., 3. While the article speaks in terms of revival, it is important to note that Lithuanians 
use this terminology throughout this process. While the case for revival certainly exists, this term 
is meant to justify the national movement as a continuation of the past, rather than the inven-
tion of new traditions and ideas, and therefore, more palatable to the international community.
36 “Mūsų siekiai” (Our Aspirations), Lietuvos Aidas, trans. Kristina Petruitytė, January 5, 1918, 
#3(51), p.1. http://www.epaveldas.lt/vbspi/biRecord.do?biExemplarId=66492.
37 Ibid., 1.
38 “Mūsų siekiai,” 1.
39 Kiaupa, 238. 
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States rallied together on behalf of the Lithuanian people so effectively that their 
significance cannot be overemphasized. Alfred Senn highlights the intellectuals 
and students of Western Europe as the centre of the national movement until 
1917, led by Juozas Gabrys and other members of Lithuania’s expatriated intel-
ligentsia.40 Tomas Balkelis, on the other hand, dismisses Senn’s perspective as too 
narrow, following the exploits of a few well-known leaders at the expense of the 
masses.41 Instead, Balkelis credits the oft-ignored émigré population in Russia 
with the highest levels of political agitation concerning Lithuanian national-
ism prior to the birth of the new state. Unfortunately, this group frequently 
found itself silenced by their precarious existence as refugees in the last years of 
the Russian Empire.42 Heated debates in St. Petersburg at this time may have 
heavily influenced the perspectives of their participants, but the refugees failed 
to establish any unified platform concerning their homeland. Moreover, they 
dared not publically declare themselves in favor of a wholly independent state 
while receiving food and other forms of aid from a Russian government still 
clinging to its hopes of restoring the Baltic region to its borderlands by the end 
of the war.43 While both Senn and Balkelis make excellent points concerning 
the nature and value of each camp of advocates, neither Eastern nor Western 
European refugee groups could single-handedly dictate the Lithuania debate and 
hope to succeed. A third segment of the Lithuanian population, Lithuanian-
Americans, pouring out their voices and resources on behalf of their homeland, 
unquestionably influenced the character of Lithuanian nationalism and proved 
vital in orchestrating the creation of a Lithuanian state. With their uniquely 
American flair, these efforts helped trigger relatively positive results where so 
many other national campaigns had failed (i.e. Czechoslovakia). 
 The Lithuanian Information Bureau underscores the significance of these 
populations in the development of Lithuanian national fervor and advocacy 
for a Lithuanian state. As Tomas Balkelis ironically points out, the first calls 
for full Lithuanian independence came not from Lithuania proper, but from 
a conference of émigrés in Bern, Switzerland in 1916.44 The conference itself 
stemmed from the rigorous efforts of an organization known as the Lithuanian 
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Information Bureau, a Paris-based group founded in 1911 under the leadership 
of exiled Lithuanian politician Juozas Gabrys. Designed to educate the rest of 
the world on the history, culture, and present circumstances in Lithuania, the 
Bureau published prolifically, distributing over fifty works in French (still the 
diplomatic language of Europe) that describe Lithuanian language, customs, 
and historical significance.45 Though they transferred operations to Switzerland 
as war swept into France, the Bureau continued working tirelessly to draw at-
tention to a region otherwise overlooked in an international arena dominated 
by multi-ethnic empires. In response to these efforts, Lithuanian populations 
across the globe took up the cause of their homeland with a fervor that could 
not yet express itself in Lithuania proper.
 Heavily concerned with the state of affairs in their war-torn homeland, 
Lithuanians in America kept a watchful eye on the region as the war unfolded. 
As early as September 1914, the Lithuanian immigrant community called 
a conference, gathering representatives from as many existing Lithuanian-
American organizations as possible to consider the war’s implications for their 
homeland and the appropriate course of action. The delegates rallied to the 
Lithuanian cause, publishing resolutions concerning increased autonomy for 
Lithuania, while establishing a National Fund for their cause, and pledging 
to actively solicit the US government to aid in the protection of Lithuanian 
interests.46 To further this endeavor, the conference voted to establish a branch 
of the Lithuanian Information Bureau within the United States to assist in the 
publication and distribution of information to support their cause. Though this 
gathering highlighted a number of practical and ideological differences among 
the various organizations, it galvanized the émigré population into a flurry of 
activity, hoping to call attention to Lithuania’s plight. 
 Perhaps the most vital and ongoing role filled by Lithuanian-Americans in 
the shaping Lithuanian identity lay in their thorough and persistent dissemina-
tion of information concerning their homeland and its aspirations. Their steady 
stream of publications over the course of the war focused intently on stories 
that provided background on the Lithuanian people or evidence with which 
to strengthen the Lithuanian cause. With titles like A Plea for the Lithuanians 
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and Lithuanian Booster, journals and magazines sought to enlist the interest 
and assistance of as wide an audience as possible, whether that aid presented 
itself in military action, peace processes, agitation for independence, or any 
combination thereof. Under the guidance of the Lithuanian National Council, 
the Washington D. C.-based Information Bureau rallied the United States to 
the cause of independence, and counteracted any rival claims to the Lithuanian 
homeland. Thus Lithuanian-Americans rapidly became Lithuania’s loudest and 
most prolific defendants.47 
 These calls for autonomy abounded within Lithuanian-American society, 
but the majority of Lithuanian émigrés initially focused their efforts on more 
feasible projects addressing more immediate needs caused by the war. To that 
end, the American Relief Fund for Lithuanian War Sufferers began collecting 
funds to alleviate the suffering within the Lithuanian population. Already de-
veloping into Lithuania’s strongest advocates, Lithuanian-Americans flooded 
newspapers with articles calling attention to events along the Eastern Front. 
Many such articles point out that the German and Russian armies had swept 
through Lithuania six times by August 1916 in their struggle for dominance, 
but that international aid organizations had largely ignored the damage inflicted 
on the now-starving Lithuanian people.48 This ignorance stems at least in part 
from a widespread lack of understanding concerning the region and its people. 
One article blames the error on the fact that regions of Lithuania at this time 
found itself incorrectly labeled by military experts as Northern Poland, while 
Polish relief organizations felt they had little reason to concern themselves with 
Lithuanian refugees.49 Some Lithuanian-Americans found the misnomer highly 
offensive, as one letter to the editor indignantly reclaims these territories as 
distinctly Lithuanian, marked by a unique language and culture.50 Faced with 
such instances of ignorance, the Relief Fund doubled its efforts, even sending 
investigative teams into the Lithuanian war-zone to assess matters, and obtain-
ing an audience with the Pope concerning the dire situation.51 This intensity of 
feeling in Lithuanian-American communities merely indicates a rapid growth of 
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nationalist sentiments within the Lithuanian population abroad that massively 
contributed to the Lithuanian cause. 
 After months of urging, the Relief Fund and Lithuanian-Americans at large 
convinced Congress and President Wilson to declare November 1 as Lithuania 
Day, in which US citizens might “express their sympathy by contributing to the 
funds now being raised for the relief of Lithuanians in the war zone.”52 Jointly 
and independently, various Lithuanian-American societies raised hundreds of 
thousands of dollars dedicated to the Lithuanian cause over the course of the 
war. Even personal occasions like weddings became fundraising events, like one 
small Chicago wedding that raised $13.25 for the Fund ($296.5 in 2012).53 
Some of these funds went directly to the front lines to ease the hardships of 
war, while the organizations dedicated various levels of funding to the fight 
for autonomy or independence, cultural education, and diplomatic endeavors. 
These numbers become significantly more impressive with the realization that 
the average Lithuanian-American family made a mere $638 per year prior to 
the war ($14,397.87 in 2012).54 Nor did Lithuanian-Americans’ giving end 
there; when the US finally entered the war in 1917, between 30,000 to 50,000 
Lithuanian Americans rushed to fill the ranks of the military.55
 Financial aid and military service certainly advanced Lithuanian national 
endeavors, but Lithuanian-Americans had still more to say concerning the 
Lithuanian state and national identity. Realizing that Polish and Russian repre-
sentatives with their own agendas for the territory had already begun spreading 
their beliefs across Washington, Lithuanian-Americans saw an urgent need to 
counteract any claims that did not align with their own agenda for a future 
Lithuanian state.56 In the steady stream of articles aimed directly at US govern-
ment agencies, politicians, and the press, the Information Bureau compiled 
an extensive body of evidence in favor of Lithuanian sovereignty that came 
to represent the general consensus of most Lithuanian-Americans and their 
organizations.57 
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 A prime example of this advocacy arises in the “American Lithuanian’s 
Declaration” that the Lithuanian National Council handed to President Wilson, 
the Pope’s representatives, and European ambassadors in early 1917. In this 
text, Lithuanian-Americans briefly outlined Lithuania’s history as a separate 
nation and powerful state in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, establishing 
Lithuania’s historical legitimacy on the global stage.58 The text goes on to speak 
of Lithuania’s unsubdued national sentiment and desire for independence as 
exemplified in peasant songs and literature, confirming that despite Russian 
occupation and repression, Lithuania lived on in cultural artifacts among intel-
ligentsia and peasants alike. Moreover, the article emphasizes the Lithuanian’s 
role in the Revolution of 1905, perhaps embellishing the truth in order to win 
the admiration and support of American and international leaders.59 Ultimately, 
the declaration implies that granting Lithuanians their freedom would greatly 
assist the international endeavor to stop the bloodshed, a claim that, while not 
necessarily grounded in reality, certainly appealed to the Allied Powers’ desire 
to end the war in a tidy manner. The text reflects many tactics of Lithuanian-
American advocacy that would find themselves repeated continuously in the 
coming years, as well as a willingness to bluntly address even the highest levels 
of leadership on behalf of a future Lithuanian state. Publications like this one 
flooded the press and provide crucial insight into the evolution of Lithuanian 
national identity in the eyes of Lithuanian-Americans. Moreover, these works 
reiterate the vast extent to which Lithuanian-Americans weighed in on the 
affairs of their homeland as war raged onward and Lithuanians pressed closer 
to their goal of independence. 
Obstacles to Recognition: Fighting for Acceptance in the Post-War World.
When the Tarbya published its declaration of independence, the German oc-
cupation rendered the document ineffective in any practical sense.  Lithuanians 
could neither form their own government, nor make their own decisions in the 
diplomatic arena, and daily life changed little. Despite this lack of tangible re-
sults, Lithuanian-Americans immediately jumped to the defense of the new state 
and began outlining their expectations for the direction this state should take. 
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A convention of Lithuanians met in New York City in March 1918, echoing 
the words of the Tarbya’s declaration as they confirmed that Lithuania existed 
as a sovereign “ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political entity” based 
firmly upon President Wilson’s declaration concerning self-determination.60 
Although technically Lithuanian-Americans had no legal right to dictate the 
requirements of the Lithuanian state, the convention went on to outline various 
rights and freedoms that “citizen[s] of Lithuania […] shall enjoy,” as well as 
policies concerning the nationalization of resources and commercial enterprises, 
and the republican form of government to be established.61 On some level, it 
seems mildly absurd that an émigré population might dictate the formation 
of a new state, but the role played thus-far by the Lithuanian-American com-
munity gave them a significant amount of leverage. While the leaders and 
politicians in Lithuania certainly could have ignored these voices from across 
the sea, in reality, Lithuanian émigrés possessed a great deal more freedom at 
the time than Lithuanians still under the German Ober Ost. These politicians 
and activists owed and would continue to owe quite a debt to the work of the 
Lithuanian population abroad as they waited out the end of the war, trying to 
make their audacious declaration a reality. In the international arena moreover, 
these declarations proved absolutely necessary for any state that hoped to earn 
international recognition within the context of the war, reassuring all that they 
would subscribe to democratic principles and look out for the well-being of all 
their citizens so as to prevent future wars from occurring on such a horrendous 
scale. Such declarations from Lithuanian-Americans served to make the idea of 
an independent Lithuania as palatable as possible to the United States, which 
appeared to wield increasing amounts of influence over the course of the war 
and its eventual resolve. 
 As Lithuania’s politicians balanced precariously between the German 
occupation and their assertion of independence, the Lithuanian National 
Council in Washington D. C. began publishing “Facts Supporting Her Claim 
for Reestablishment as an Independent Nation” to convince the world of the 
validity of Lithuania’s declaration, and solicit the aid of the so-called Great 
Powers in this process.62 The pamphlet served as a template for many subsequent 
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documents, briefly outlining the territories that Lithuanians intended to include 
in their new state and reiterating their linguistic distinctions, before delving 
into a shortened version of Lithuanian history from the thirteenth century 
onward. Interestingly, the pamphlet refers to the outbreak of war in 1914 as an 
untimely interruption of a Lithuanian national revival and the people’s efforts 
towards independence, despite more recent scholarship to the contrary.63 Prior 
to the war, Lithuanian nationalism had not yet achieved a level of coherency 
needed to consider statehood, much less view it as an inevitable reality. In 
fact, most scholars concur that the war played a vital role in accelerating the 
development of national identity in Lithuania. In light of this contradiction, 
the Lithuanian National Council’s claims reflect overconfidence at best, and 
utter delusion at worst, but this reflects just how fervent Lithuanian national-
ism had become within the émigré population of the United States. After all 
the rallies, all the publications, and all their efforts on behalf of the homeland, 
Lithuanian-Americans genuinely believed that their brothers would have secured 
their liberty even sooner without the war. Present perspectives may discount 
such ideas, but the pamphlet’s approach still appears logical as the words of a 
national movement justifying its claims for an independent state. If Lithuania 
had made its way to the brink of liberation prior to the war, then how could 
anyone deny them their freedom after much suffering and delay? Although 
the council could not have predicted it, the text also handily preempts many 
complaints that smaller national groups greedily demanded far more than they 
could reasonably claim. If Lithuania could prevent itself from falling into such 
categories, then the Great Powers (and subsequently the League of Nations) 
might treat their national agenda with more care and respect.
  As World War One petered towards the armistice in 1918 and German 
power waned, Lithuanians finally began developing an independent state for 
themselves and those minorities that chose to remain under their jurisdiction. 
The tasks of formulating their new government and continuing to appeal for 
international recognition of their infant state consumed their efforts. Lithuanians 
all over the world had struggled and petitioned for this moment for years, but 
the end of the war brought unprecedented opportunities for Lithuanians to 
define themselves and their homeland. With this freedom, however, came the 
massive responsibility of outlining a Lithuanian identity that the majority of 
63 Lithuania: Facts, 37.
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the world both inside and outside Lithuania would also find acceptable. Faced 
with a seemingly insurmountable task, the Lithuanian leadership strove to form 
a government based on the principles of democracy that the new global leaders 
held as the standard (at least in Europe).  As part of this process, the Tarbya 
established a provisional government headed by Augustinas Voldemaras as 
prime minister, and a Council and Cabinet of Ministers to serve as the executive 
branch until a Constituent Assembly could be called to hammer out the finer 
points of state. Moreover, Lithuania began sending out envoys to its nearest 
neighbors, and gathering delegations to attend the Paris Peace Conference, 
where they hoped to persuade the world to acknowledge their existence. As if 
to combine forces, delegations from the new Lithuanian government and from 
Lithuanian-Americans converged at the conference to convince the world of 
their legitimacy. While they failed to gain any direct acknowledgement, one 
paragraph of the resultant Treaty of Versailles did allow the provisional govern-
ments in all three of the Baltic States to take any necessary measures to defend 
against the spread of Bolshevism.64 This indirect sort of acquiescence, however, 
still denied Lithuania the official status of statehood, and restricted the forms 
of aid that other states could or would give.  
 Although Lithuanians may not have appreciated this struggle, the ongo-
ing fight for recognition forced Lithuanians to really articulate their agenda, 
how they perceived themselves, and what they wanted as a long term political 
entity. Since much of Eastern Europe saw the end of the war as an opportu-
nity to spring free of Russian dominion and German occupation in one fell 
swoop, the quest for recognition developed not just among Lithuanians and 
Lithuanian-Americans. In September, 1919, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians 
and Ukrainians in the United States banded together in order to present their 
cases jointly. In this congress, the four nationalities argued that their children 
had helped the US in their fight to end autocratic governments and oppres-
sion, and that they, as representatives of three million Americans, desired their 
adopted country to extend a hand of warmth and friendship to their beloved 
homelands.65 The joint congress reiterated the similarity of ideals between their 
homelands and the US, while emphasizing the United States’ line that World 
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War One had occurred so that these peoples too might enjoy the democracy 
and liberty that so embodied the war in American minds.66 This combined 
effort underscores that Lithuania by no means stood alone as a young nation 
begging for international blessings to progress with the formation of a new state. 
These fledgling movements profited greatly from such US-based alliances when 
addressing international leaders, either individually or as the League of Nations, 
despite the fact that such alliances did not often exist in the European sphere. 
While such efforts may have convinced other leaders however, it seems that in 
most cases, the United States refused to budge.
 On September 25, 1919, Great Britain became the first of the Great Powers 
to recognize Lithuania as an independent state, while Lithuania’s nearest neigh-
bors soon followed suit.67 For Britain, recognition came out of the practicalities 
of the post-war environment. Fearing the spread of Bolshevism outward from 
Russia’s borders, Britain saw the entire Baltic region as a potential barrier to 
further Bolshevik expansion. By recognizing Lithuania, the British could as-
sist in the struggle against the Bolsheviks and thus protect the rest of Europe 
from the fearful specter of Communism.68 While perhaps more utilitarian than 
springing from conviction, this decision dramatically benefited the Lithuanian 
national cause. British recognition ignited a wave of other recognitions for an 
independent Lithuania, ranging from France to Sweden and even Argentina.69 
The United States, however, continued to deny the legitimacy of a Lithuanian 
state for a significantly longer period, much to the dismay of Lithuanians on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
Obstacles Part II: Convincing the Americans
Lithuanian efforts to obtain official American approval continued to construct 
and solidify the textures and appearances of the Lithuanian state and what it 
meant to be a Lithuanian, relying on a combination of history, ethnography, 
and constant comparisons of themselves and their new state with longstanding 
American principles and explicitly stated war aims. The Lithuanian Review, a 
publication of the Lithuanian Information Bureau, outlined “Three Reasons 
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why Americans should Recognize Lithuania” that help illustrate the developing 
Lithuanian identity. According to the article, the United States should recog-
nize Lithuanian sovereignty first and foremost because it falls in line with “the 
declared American war aims of ethnic self-determination for racially distinct 
groups.”70 The section firmly asserts Lithuania’s racial distinctness and chid-
ingly reminds readers that American opinion aligned with Lithuanian desires 
and that ignoring racial differences in the Balkans helped spark the war in 
the first place. By bluntly reminding their adopted country that these issues 
played a role in dragging the world into war, Lithuanian-Americans cleverly 
hinted that recognition would help prevent future conflict and allow the US 
to return to its own affairs. Secondly, the article reminds Americans of their 
own struggle for statehood, recalling their contribution to that cause in the 
person of General Tadeusz Koscuiszko (despite Polish claims to the contrary), 
and favorably comparing American liberties to those sought by Lithuanians in 
the post-war world.71 How could the United States deny Lithuanians the right 
to their own state when all they wanted were the freedoms and traditions that 
the US had once fought so hard to gain and defended fiercely ever since? The 
article’s third reason manipulates American and international desires to never 
experience another war like the one that had just torn Europe apart, claiming 
that an independent Lithuania would stand against Germany as it had already 
done and that such efforts more than amply justified recognizing Lithuanian 
independence.
 Unfortunately for the Lithuanians, this last justification failed to hold 
up under any level of scrutiny within the international situation in 1919. In 
reality, Lithuania had collaborated closely with the Germans in the last years 
of the war as other options had failed them and the new state still found itself 
heavily dependent on Germany in the initial post-war era. As long as other 
powers refused to acknowledge Lithuania’s existence, Germany became one of 
the few venues through which Lithuanians could voice their opinions in an 
international forum, and German troops remained in Lithuania long after the 
war’s end. Moreover, international politics had shifted greatly with the rise of 
the Bolsheviks, transforming Russia into a greater source of anxiety than the 
heavily punished Germans. As long as the threat of socialism hung over Europe, 
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the United States in particular seemed willing to support Germany so long as 
it held back the Bolsheviks, while Lithuania mattered little either way. This 
error in calculation reveals that despite his fervor, the aforementioned article’s 
author could not quite grasp the new international balance of power, particularly 
concerning Germany and Russia. 
 Advocates of Lithuanian recognition in the US repeatedly relied on American 
policies and historical traditions in order to persuade US officials to grant their 
blessing to the Lithuanian experiment of statehood. One memo pulls quotes 
from James Buchanan, Woodrow Wilson, and Secretary of State Lansing that 
remind US leaders of the long-standing US policy of support for self-determi-
nation.72 A 1921 letter to then-Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, blames US 
policies, refusing to acknowledge the fall of the Russian Empire for the delay in 
recognition.73 As long as the US held out hope that the tsars would return, its 
diplomatic branch refused to consider any changes to Russia’s former territo-
ries, a move that certain American lawyers, statesmen, and experts considered 
extremely counterproductive. As William McAdoo, Herbert Adams Gibbons, 
and Walter M. Chandler cautioned in their letter, doing nothing in hopes that 
the former Russian Empire would reemerge left non-Russian borderlands such 
as Lithuania vulnerable to the spread of Bolshevism, a move that certainly 
could not benefit the United States long term.74 These gentlemen also warned 
that tensions between the Poles and Lithuanians over Vilna and other border 
disputes might lead Europe into war again, a dismal prospect for anyone hop-
ing that World War One had literally been the war to end all wars. The fact 
that the League of Nations refused to allow Lithuania to join due to the US 
attitude toward the young nation only fortified these fears, since this meant 
that no major power would actively interfere in the event of Polish-Lithuanian 
aggression.75 Lithuanian-Americans and their allies actively pointed out such 
problems in hopes of convincing the United States of what they considered a 
dire need for action concerning their homeland. They bombarded US officials 
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with proof of other countries that had already granted recognition to Lithuania 
as if the sheer volume of these memos would convince them to change their 
minds. Another approach included a detailed analysis of Lithuania’s economic 
status in which the author presented various statistics for education, agriculture, 
industry, and the financial sector, as if proving Lithuania’s economic viability 
would convince the United States to actually recognize its independence.76
 Even after the League of Nations admitted Lithuania as a member, the 
United States continued to stall, as if waiting would somehow force the issue 
to disappear. While one might speculate that America’s Red Scare and rampant 
phobia of Bolshevism forced the United States to insist on the sovereignty of a 
dead Russian empire, a realistic analysis of the situation reveals very little in the 
way of logic that justifies US action or rather inaction in this situation. When 
Secretary of State Hughes finally announced US recognition for Lithuania on 
July 25, 1922, he provided no substantial reasons for his delay outside of the 
Russian factor, and seemed resigned only because so many other nations had 
already done so. With this announcement, Lithuania finally attained a measure 
of security in knowing that none of the Great Powers questioned their right to 
existence any longer.77
On the Map: Defining and Defending Lithuania’s Borders
In striving to prove Lithuania’s historical and cultural rights to the land in such 
a way that neither Russia, Germany, Poland, nor anyone else could contradict, 
Lithuanians on both sides of the Atlantic faced the enormous problem of draw-
ing territorial boundaries that would prove acceptable to both the Lithuanian 
population and the greatest number of European states possible. In a Lithuania 
that had existed under foreign occupation for more than a century, borders had 
been drawn and redrawn according to the policies of the Russian Empire and 
the fortunes of war. Alfonsas Eidintas, Vytautas Žalys, and Alfred Erich Senn 
illustrate that when Lithuanians everywhere found themselves faced with the 
sudden potential to outline their own borders, they lacked any definite blueprint 
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from which to begin.78 In undertaking the design of a new state, Lithuanians 
struggled to choose between the lands once ruled by their ancestors, all the 
lands Lithuanians had ever inhabited, or lands where Lithuanians lived in the 
present.79 This choice between the historic and variations on the ethnographic 
became even further complicated by the reality that other states, as well as 
internal nationalities might dispute any of these claims. A somewhat vague 
and unhelpful answer to this problem came about when President Wilson 
agreed to form a committee for the sole purpose of investigating the Lithuanian 
question in May 1918. “’Ask for the most, but always have proof that it truly 
belongs to you,’” advised the committee’s chairman, Harvard professor Frank A. 
Golder.80 Although Golder went on to detail certain regions and ethno-religious 
backgrounds that could logically be included, this statement underscores the 
complexity of the task facing the Lithuanians. Exactly where and how much 
land could they carve out of Europe to meet the needs of a Lithuanian state, 
while maintaining the legitimacy of those claims?
 Even as Lithuanians wrestled with these questions, external forces began 
to impose their own interpretations upon the region, challenging not only 
specific aspects of the process, but the entire legitimacy of a Lithuanian state. 
Foremost of these challenges came from Bolshevik Russia, which despite being 
enveloped in its own civil war, increasingly desired to retain the borders of the 
former Russian Empire as its own.  Almost immediately after the armistice 
took effect across Europe, the Bolsheviks reneged on the terms of the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk and launched a full scale invasion of the still army-less infant 
republic. Though some German troops remained in the region at the time, 
they and their Lithuanian counterparts proved unable to ward off the invasion, 
sending Lithuanian leaders fleeing the capital in order to preserve their young 
government. Local socialists welcomed this invasion with open arms, and in 
February 1919, the Bolsheviks set up their own government in Vilna under 
the jurisdiction of the Soviet Republic of Litbel, a quasi-state that combined 
both the names and territories of Lithuania and Belorussia.81 Meanwhile, most 
Lithuanians rallied to defend their republic, bolstered by high hopes and the 
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new government’s promises of land reform to a population dominated by 
peasants.82 A clever diplomatic move by Lithuania’s new leaders, this promise 
ushered in droves of peasant volunteers, giving them a tangible reason to invest 
in the future of the young state and fight in its defense. By the summer of 1919, 
a combination of German, Lithuanian, and Polish armies had neutralized the 
government of Litbel, forcing the Soviets to negotiate peace. The treaty signed 
in July 1920 reestablished desirable Lithuanian borders (for the Lithuanians) 
and relinquished all Soviet claims on Lithuania’s people or resources.83 Over-
stretched by civil war and a badly damaged economy, the Soviets proved unable 
to enforce their version of Lithuania upon the region, while their failure only 
seemed to validate the existence of a Lithuanian state and inject Lithuanian 
nationalism with even greater enthusiasm.
The Vilna Conflict
As the Lithuanians successfully fought off the Soviets and rogue German forces 
known as the Bermondtists, their long-standing conflicts with the Poles came 
to a head under the pressures of the two groups’ diverging conceptions for the 
future of the region, and posed serious setbacks to Lithuanian nationalism and 
its definitions. As previously discussed, Russian policies had fostered opposing 
nationalisms in the region as a means of keeping Polish ambitions in check, but 
neither people agreed to Russian perceptions of nationality or territory. The 
same issues that had undermined the 1863 Uprising only grew more pressing 
as Polish troops under the command of Józef Piłsudski crossed into Lithuanian 
lands under the pretext of fighting off the Soviets. The Russo-Polish War, sup-
ported by Western powers as a challenge to the spread of Bolshevism, bought 
Lithuanians time to muster their own armies against the Soviets, but also nulli-
fied many stipulations of the Soviet-Lithuanian peace treaty before the ink had 
even dried. The Poles, not the Lithuanians, forced the Soviets from Vilna before 
settling in, reclaiming the city as their historic right, with the intention of using 
it as a jumping off point to reclaim territory that they perceived as rightfully 
Polish. The ensuing conflict sheds light on the processes through which both 
groups presented their definitions of Lithuania and how Lithuanians dealt with 
82 Eidintas, Žalys, and Senn, 36-37.
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the these developments in the international arena. 
 Incensed over the loss of their capital, but militarily too weak to launch a 
counterattack, Lithuanians’ vocal complaints dragged the League of Nations 
into the issue, forcing both parties to defend their claims to the city. To this end, 
the Lithuanian Delegation published a book concerning the “Lithuanian-Polish 
Dispute” complete with maps, drafts of protocols and agreements between 
the two parties, presenting the same historical narrative used during the in-
dependence and recognition debates. While initially factual, the documents 
quickly escalated to accusations of carefully planned deception on the part of 
the Poles. One section blasts the Poles for negotiating a peace agreement in 
1920 only to move troops into Vilna a mere two days later.84 Another section 
claims that the League of Nations only involved itself in the issue after Polish 
leaders falsely accused the Lithuanians of cooperating with the Bolsheviks and 
instigating the aggression between the two peoples.85 In reality, Lithuanians 
lacked solid factual support for their claims to the city, but Poland’s blatant 
dishonesty and naked aggression in war-weary Europe pushed the League to 
protect Lithuania from further incursions. To this end, the League established 
a new border between Poland and Lithuania called the Curzon Line, which 
Piłsudski promptly defied by moving his troops into territory that the League 
had just explicitly recognized as Lithuanian. Unfortunately for Lithuanians, 
the League preferred to preserve more widespread peace than try to physically 
enforce their decisions and risk another massive war.
 Once again, Lithuanian-Americans led the way in defending their home-
land’s burgeoning identity, going to great lengths to persuade their new country 
to stand against Polish aggression. In the Lithuanian National Council’s pam-
phlet Lithuania Against Poland: Appeal for Justice, they couched their requests 
in language both flattering and familiar to the United States, drawing subtle 
parallels between Lithuania’s situation and US history while relying on lofty 
ideals to which they believe the US has long subscribed. The pamphlet estab-
lished Lithuania as the underdog in the situation, set upon by the “numerically 
stronger power” of Polish forces, and favorably compared Lithuania to the 
United States’ own early history.86 The authors further relied on US sympathies 
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when they reminded the president that they had only fled Lithuania to escape 
Russian despotism, now replaced by Polish despotism in their minds. Given 
the US entanglement in its own Red Scare at the time, they tactfully reminded 
the US government that Lithuanian had taken up arms against Bolshevik 
forces, thus creating a sense of political solidarity between the two states and 
strengthening their plea for aid. Moreover, they expressed their appeal in terms 
of what “American citizens believe,” implying that their requests stem from 
the sense of justice instilled in them by their ties to the United States.87 They 
claimed that a US failure to get involved would constitute a failure to live up 
to its own principles of justice and fair play. Ignoring the fact that the US had 
neglected to even acknowledge Lithuanian sovereignty almost two years after 
they declared independence, Lithuanian Americans felt that their new nation 
had a moral obligation to come to the aid of their homeland and had no qualms 
about saying so. 
 The Poles, however, did not merely entrench themselves within the disputed 
capital and dare Lithuania to come unseat them. They too compiled evidence 
to justify their actions, often directly contradicting the Lithuanian account. A 
Polish historical journal compiled its own collection of articles geared toward 
what it terms “The Question of Wilno.”88 The first article traces Polish influence 
within Lithuanian culture, from religion, literature, language, and the nobil-
ity. Its author claims that Lithuanians owe the Poles for Catholicism, for the 
educated members of its population, and a plethora of cultural developments, 
thereby concluding that all of Lithuania should fall under Polish jurisdiction. 
The second article, however, directly engages the questions surrounding the city 
of Vilna, claimed by Lithuania as its historic capital, and by Poland as a vital 
cultural center. Reciting the same tale of the Lithuanian-Polish Union used by 
Lithuanians to field their complaints, their rendition’s subtle changes transform 
the same narrative into a fairly convincing case on behalf of the Poles. Where 
Lithuanians claim strict distinctions between their people and the Poles, the 
Polish account finds Russian nationalization policies to blame for the lessening 
of Polish influence by death, imprisonment, or deportation.89 Moreover, it cites 
the German census to claim that Poles indeed held a majority within the limits 
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of Vilna.90 Such contradictory narratives coming from both parties called into 
question both versions of history, while making it exceedingly problematic for 
the League to act decisively on the matter. 
 As the League of Nations turned their attention to larger concerns and 
the Poles settled more permanently into Vilna, everyone but the Lithuanians 
accepted the de facto situation. They never once relinquished their claims to 
the city, and vocalized their grievances long after the matter had dropped from 
the international scene. The simplest explanation for this lies in significance of 
the capital city to national identity, and by extension, Vilna’s significance to the 
Lithuanian narrative. Capital cities often represent a nation and its ideals, while 
also standing as a center of government and culture. Much like the burning of 
Washington D.C. in the War of 1812, the loss of Vilna struck a heavy blow to 
Lithuanian morale, perhaps all the heavier for its richer history.  The city, from 
which their forefathers had ruled what had formerly been the largest contiguous 
empire in Europe, appeared time after time in the Lithuanian narrative—as 
the home of the great Duke Gediminas, the place where Lithuanians were first 
baptized into Christianity, and where educated nationalists had moved to share 
ideas and foment on behalf of a Lithuanian nation.91 Despite its relatively small 
Lithuanian population, Vilna represented the heart and soul of the Lithuanian 
nation. The Lithuanians could not forgive the Poles for snatching Vilna from 
their grasp; indeed, their anger over the lost city and its surrounding territory 
kept them locked in a state of war with Poland until 1938. 
 From their precarious and less-recognized position, however, Lithuanian 
leaders lacked the manpower and international support to take the city back by 
force, so it remained part of Poland until the Second World War.92 The conflict, 
however, helped invest Lithuanians on both sides of the Atlantic in the fate 
of their homeland. Although a setback in the Lithuanian narrative, the loss of 
Vilna only solidified the nation’s borders in the collective Lithuanian imagina-
tion, borders that many hoped to one day restore even as they began addressing 
more immediate problems. It strengthened ties between Lithuanian-Americans 
and Lithuania so much that many returned to Lithuania—to raise families, 
start businesses, and otherwise rebuild the region—while others dedicated 
their efforts to travelling between the two communities and building up strong 
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connections. Thus the Vilna Conflict, though a negative event in the process of 
outlining a Lithuanian nation-state, bolstered Lithuanian national identity in 
a way the Poles could not have foreseen. The Soviet Union quasi-restored such 
imaginings, along with Vilna, after the Second World War, while the second 
Lithuanian Republic solidified them in the early 1990’s.
The Memel Question
A more successful attempt by the Lithuanians to dictate the limits of their 
identity arose from their fight for the port city of Memel (present day Klaipėda) 
and the surrounding territory known as the Memel strip. Although the territory 
contained a significant population of Lithuanians, the German administration 
had placed the region within the jurisdiction of Lithuania Minor, the smaller, 
Prussian-ruled entity until the end of the war. Unlike Vilna, whose significance 
remained purely nostalgic in even Lithuanian minds, Memel held the promise 
of prosperity for the young nation. Lacking any major port cities, Lithuanian 
leaders had entered into discussions with the Germans concerning Memel as 
early as 1916.93 By war’s end, Germany, and even Poland had, for various reasons, 
agreed to turn over the district to the Lithuanians. Despite this, the international 
community turned the territory over to Allied administration, with plans to 
internationalize the city and grant Allied Powers a foothold in an otherwise 
removed Eastern Europe.94 Lithuanians objected to handing Memel over to 
the French and passed a resolution to join all of Lithuania Minor (including 
the area surrounding Konigsberg), with the Lithuanian state. Adding to the 
confusion, the territory’s population divided almost evenly into Germans and 
Lithuanians, who worried about Lithuania’s economic prospects and being cut 
off from Germany. 
 1922 found Lithuania caught in an untenable position concerning Memel. 
Hoping to settle the region and guard against German and Russian ambitions, 
the British offered to give Memel to Lithuania along with de jure recognition 
and economic aid. In return, they expected Lithuanians to surrender Vilna to 
the Poles and let the matter drop.95 As Vytautas Žalys points out, however, the 
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Lithuanian government could not bend on the Vilna issue without angering 
the Lithuanian people, citing an assassination attempt of an official who had 
suggested negotiations with Poland previously.96 Unwilling to let the region 
slip from their grasp, and spurred on by the occupation of Vilna, Lithuanian 
leaders organized an uprising dominated by Memel Lithuanians, and seized 
the district in December of 1922.  
 The Allied Powers objected strongly to such flagrant aggression, and quickly 
blockaded the harbor to force the Lithuanians to back down. In the face of 
the strong Allied response, the Lithuanians had no choice but to remove their 
troops, but only with the promise of a renewed discussion over the fate of the 
territory. Throughout the ensuing, yearlong diplomatic impasse, the Lithuanian 
Information Bureau continued to play a vital role, gathering and publishing 
correspondence that contextualized the issue and provided favorable evidence 
supporting Lithuania’s claims and actions. In one such volume, the Bureau 
claimed that Memel territory possessed a significantly higher Lithuanian 
population than the Germans claimed, that the port served as a vital aspect 
of Lithuania’s economic viability, and that Memel also needed Lithuanian 
commerce to survive.97 The Bureau also includes documents from Prussian 
Lithuanians in the district warning that Memel would be far too small to form 
an economically viable free state and the people of the territory preferred a 
union with Lithuania.98 
 The Allied Powers, predominately Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the 
United States, proved much more flexible concerning Memel than the League of 
Nations had with Poland, especially since many believed that giving Lithuania 
Memel would make up for the as yet unresolved issue of Vilna. Even so, iron-
ing out an agreement that both parties deemed acceptable proved exceedingly 
difficult. The Lithuanian Information Bureau emphasizes the difficulties of this 
process by displaying the proposed versions of the convention side by side. The 
Lithuanian draft of the agreement rewrote more than half its articles, making 
changes down to the smallest, seemingly insignificant details and phrasings.99 
While even the smallest changes met with disapproval from the Allied Powers, 
the Lithuanians clung stubbornly to the port city as rightfully their own, fighting 
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tooth and nail for as many of their stipulations concerning the composition 
and jurisdiction of the region as possible.100
 The Lithuanians’ aggressive behavior, while seemingly abrupt and dramatic, 
pointedly reflects Lithuanian leaders’ chagrin over their failure to recover Vilna, 
and their stubborn refusal to lose another inch of perceived Lithuanian ground. 
After two years of futilely trying to unseat the Polish presence, Lithuanians had 
no intention of letting another region, one more economically vital at that, slip 
from their grasp. The seizure of Memel reflects a Lithuanian adaptability to 
the challenges confronting their chosen narrative. Lithuanian leaders, already 
precariously balanced at the head of the new state, and under fire for the loss of 
Vilna, could not afford another failure of this nature if they wished to maintain 
the people’s faith in their leadership, an urgency testified to by their sudden 
shift in tactics. While they had observed acceptable protocols with Vilna, and 
clearly failed, Lithuanians hoped that more decisive action would force the 
Allies to accept Lithuania’s version, as it had with Poland and Vilna.101 Indeed, 
this route proved much more successful in obtaining the Lithuanians’ desired 
results. After a year of deliberations, the 1924 Memel Convention officially 
recognized the region as part of the Lithuanian State. Following another four 
years of negotiations with Germany over the exact boundaries, Lithuania’s bor-
ders remained intact, encompassing Memel, lacking Vilna and the easternmost 
portions of the desired territory, until the next world war rearranged Europe’s 
borders once again. 
Final Thoughts
In his book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defines a nation as an 
imagined political entity based on a perceived “deep, horizontal comradeship” 
between its members.102 For Lithuania, this comradeship evolved slowly, from 
a mere juxtaposition of language and geography to covert groups of disgruntled 
intellectuals, and eventually, to a Lithuanian Republic. At every step of this 
development, Lithuanians struggled to define themselves and gain recognition 
as a unique society and culture, while competing narratives thoroughly chal-
lenged them to defend these conceptions both intellectually and militarily. The 
First World War brought unprecedented opportunities to imagine a sovereign 
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Lithuanian identity, bolstered by western promises for self-determination for 
all peoples. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian Declaration of Independence neces-
sitated a firm, vocal defense of this identity in the international arena, a process 
that invested Lithuanians near and far in promoting the welfare of their new 
national identity and its associated state.
 More importantly, these processes reveal an abundance of ways in which 
national identity is not only forged over imagined ties between community 
members as Anderson proposes, but also through external factors and chal-
lenges not inherently found within that community.  Polish, Russian, and 
German antagonisms following independence forced Lithuanians to defend 
a still-forming identity, adapting words and weapons to suit their needs with 
equal vigor and enthusiasm. Urgently needing to articulate the essences of 
Lithuanian identity and justify their claims to the Entente and the League of 
Nations, Lithuanians vocalized those things that they perceived as most im-
portant in defining what made someone Lithuanian, and just where Lithuania 
referred to. The debt owed to Lithuanian-Americans cannot be overstated, both 
in the manner in which they besieged the U. S. government with pleas and 
proposals, and in their efforts to fund refugee aid and finance the nascent state. 
These factors forced Lithuanians to reimagine their history and their nation in 
ways and on a scale that no prior experience had required of them. Although 
the first Lithuanian Republic lasted a mere twenty-two years, the Lithuanian 
identity went on to survive another world war and nearly fifty years of Soviet 
occupation and deportation. It served as the foundation for the longest standing 
resistance movement against the Soviets after World War Two, and again when 
Lithuanians began to openly question the long-standing Soviet hegemony in 
1990-91. Within a region of previously ambiguous identities, Lithuanians ral-
lied to form a lasting identity based on real and imagined history and culture. 
In a fascinating study on the formation of national identity, the Lithuanian 
narrative reiterates the power of Anderson’s imagined communities in shaping 
the nation and its identity, but also raises questions of exactly how such com-
munities form and what external factors must also be taken into account. 
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